Discussion by Ives, Gene
DISCUSSION 
Dr. Gene Ives, Chair 
Dr. Gene Ives (Sandia National Laboratory): Now I'd like your partici-
pation. Any comments or questions that you would like to address 
to any of the panelists or toward Dr. Burte on the nature of unified 
life cycle engineering and the role of NDE in that process? 
Dr. Michael J. Buckley (Rockwell Science Center): I have a comment. 
Well, I had to answer -- it was something to irritate everybody -Harris'" 
question about a window, and as I was sitting here thinking about it, 
I said if we could really model processes in a whole operation, NDE will 
not exist as it exists today. I think we will worry about controlling 
the process during manufacturing and work very hard to eliminate a separate 
inspection step because it costs too much. We will also work very hard 
to eliminate field inspection. We would probably rather have sensors, 
if it's a flight critical component or something of that nature, on the 
system. 
And then, to ask for a window for NDE in the traditional sense, I think, 
is solving the wrong problem. Perhaps you would ask for a window by 
saying "How would I eliminate traditional inspection and build in quality 
or build in sensors?" And I thought of 
(bearings), but that's such a specialty area, that's probably not a good 
one. And I thought of composite, and there's an area that's going to 
loom in major importance and we inspect it like crazy today, much more 
so than any other structure on an air frame. 
Why don't you try to eliminate that, because you understand it? Start 
to define what you know about the material and what you don't; control 
it during manufacturing. The semi-conductor people have to do that. 
The Japanese have gone that way. If you want to be competitive economically, 
you pretty well have to build in quality. You can't afford an extra 
step to inspect it, and you certainly don't want to tear it apart later. 
So maybe your window isn't something that people here want to hear, 
but I think the field is going to change. As we understand these things, 
you are not going to be climbing over big structures. Anyway, that's 
one view of the future. 
Dr. Bonner Staff (Lockheed): Let me respond a little to the comments 
just made with a long story and a short question. The short ques-
tion is: Where are the incentives? 
The long story is: About 12 years ago, when we were starting 
to do our probabilistic work on air frame structure, we came up 
with a couple of obvious things. There's a minimum size below which 
you can't find cracks and they don't grow at a constant rate. Those 
two things taken together say: don't inspect in the middle of your 
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expectd lifetime. When did we inspect? In the middle of our ex-
pected lifetime. 
We went to the Air Force and said, "Hey, here's some logic that 
says you can make a bunch of money if you will just change ·the time 
at which you conduct your field inspections." This bunch of money 
represents several airplanes over the life of the fleet. But that 
was tied in with the liability and the air frame responsibility 
that went clear back to the basic designs, and the Air Force said 
to the air frame manufacturer, "We will do this if you will prove 
to us that there's no risk involved." The responsibility was put 
on us to change the risk that we already had, and if we were right, 
they would benefit and we had the privilege of paying for our task. 
Now I'm back to my question. We are talking about existing field 
inspections that are going to exist over a long time period. You 
don't budget over that time period. You don't pay for the kind 
of work now that's going to reward you in that maintenance budget 
in the future. Somehow, we are able to do it on the new system 
designs, but we are still not addressing the cost benefits on a 
whole bunch of air frames out there that are beginning to suffer 
from corrosion, for example. 
Where is the incentive that causes our system to go to work and 
apply our technology for the profits that we can make from it? 
Dr. Ives: Would any of the panelists care to address that? 
Dr. W. G. Clark, Jr. (Westinghouse): I'll address that. 
I think your comments are certainly appropriate. Clearly, you know 
who your customer is and your mode of operation is clearly tied 
into that. With regard to the area of NDE and the incentive, again, 
I think your incentive has to clearly' be defined by your customer. 
In the case of Westinghouse and many different businesses, our 
incentive for inspectability concerns changes all over the place. 
If we are making copper hardware to replace in the equipment we 
built in the '30's, the concern for inspectability there is com-
pletely different from what it is for a nuclear reactor. I think 
you have to balance it against what your customer is prepared to 
pay for it. If you are letting your customer con you into doing 
things that you are paying for on your own, then I think that's 
a problem that maybe, not you, but somebody in your organization 
has got to look at. Nothing is free. Let's face it. 
Dr. Staff: We didn't do it. We continued to inspect mid-life. 
Dr. Clark: Right. 
it's too late. 
Well, I think everyone would like to inspect before 
That's my goal: the day before. (Laughter). 
Dr. Ives: I would venture that the answer to your question is either 
an enlightened customer or an enlightenable customer. 
Dr. H. M. Burte (Wright-Patterson): Let me pose a question, really, 
1812 
to get off this. We can talk about this business of how we change 
the manner in which systems are procured in order to throw this 
in. That's a very real problem. Michael's right. Maybe the 
toughest one. 
Let me pose a question to the panel or to anybody else, and it's 
really the question that my co-author, Dale Chimenti, has worried 
about very considerably. 
It's rather straightforward to see how our analytic model can 
feed in, but is there going to be a role for other forms --the 
question I was posing -- other forms of knowledge, other forms of 
information handleable by other than the analytic modeling in the 
NDE? Is that an illusory goal? 
Are those just words and pepper dust I was throwing up in posing 
those questions? Or is there really a way of capturing and codifying 
this knowledge other than these analytic models so that inspect-
ability can be gathered like this? Dale has worried about that 
a lot, and I was reflecting some of his concerns, worries and 
thoughts in the talk. 
Dr. Buckley: There hasn't been a lot of work trying to capture the 
heuristic rules along with analytic models in one program. There 
is work now beginning in that area, but I think you certainly have 
to say that people have succeeded in doing that in narrow fields, 
and that's really the success of expert systems. 
We can talk about the pitfalls, though, in this particular ap-
plication because you want something that is general and will handle 
a broad class of problems, and all the successes today have been 
in very narrow fields. I was trying to hint at that potential 
problem, and I think it is a very fundamental issue that is not 
going to be solved easily. 
I mean, a lot of the formal logic people consider these expert 
systems a hack because you simply build something to sell on one 
particular case. You got to be careful about that. You could use 
a lot of fairly broad-based rules. 
Dr. Ives: Comment? 
From the Floor: Yes. On the use of expert systems, my impression of 
the successes that they have had is that they find a solution to 
a problem; they find a way of handling something that human beings 
think is a solution. For the system, that's just a string of sym-
bols, but for us, it seems to be a solution. 
What we are trying to do here is to avoid a failure in something 
that we are inspecting. We say it's okay, and then it's not supposed 
to break. That's a very different search problem, I think. It's 
not that you find a solution; it's that you somehow find a way past 
a disaster. 
Dr. Buckley: Isn't it a diagnostics problem? 
From the Floor: Well, the diagnostics are what the doctors are looking 
for. A diagnosis, for them, is an identifiable disease and a treat-
ment program. 
Dr. Buckley: You could certainly use an example of a life-or-death issue. 
It could be. Isn't that the same thing as NDE? 
From the Floor: No. 
Dr. Buckley: In principle? 
From the Floor: You are looking at something that appears to be healthy 
in the case of NDE, and in the case of a medical exam, there are 
obvious problems. They don't apply their diagnoses, their expert 
systems, to people who seem to be healthy. (Laughter) And I think 
that's a big difference. 
Dr. Ives: We have a comment here. 
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Dr. Bob Gilmore (General Electric CRD): Yes. When you inspect, there 
is a reality: the part is really good enough to serve or it is 
really not good enough to serve, so that there are given facts. 
Now, an inspector attempts to establish this fact, and he attempts 
to establish it through various means of measurement. 
For instance, if you inspect one frequency, looking at one ampli-
tude, one threshold, yopu have a very limited perception of this 
fact, and if you have a complicated part that takes a lot of looking 
at, you may or may not detect something, and if you detected it, 
you may or may not characterize it properly. But if you test the 
thing at many frequencies from many different directions -- you 
inspect the surfaces and you inspect the bulk and you understand 
your fields and you understand what your probabilities are -- now 
you improve your perception of this fact more and more. 
Now, there are points where you want to know these things. In 
the manufacturing cycle, you want to know what the material is good 
for, and if it's an aircraft engine that has cost you $100 a pound 
for raw material, you bloody well want to know -- first of all, 
you don't want any more of it than you have to have, and you bloody 
well want to know if it's good, and you blasted well want to know 
if it's good in the high-stress points such as the bore. And as 
you proceed on with these multiple test procedures, you will improve 
your perception of the reality of this part, and you are going to 
use eddy current and you are going to use ultrasound. 
Now, after the part has been manufactured, you are going to want 
to know how it functions in service and you are going to use sensors 
where sensors are appropriate, in-flight sensors, in-service sensors. 
But you are also going to use inspections, and each time you do 
this, you limit your risk, and all these things can be structured 
in algorithms and all of them can be fed into these expert systems. 
But the fact remains that the expert system eliminates one thing 
only: shut eyes, the lack of a cup of coffee in the morning. The 
expert system is no better than the expert. It's taking a human 
being who understands these things, putting them in the software, 
and removing his fatigue. Every human being in this room qualifies. 
Put a team of 200 software engineers, assign them to each one 
of these individuals; composite the thing into a Cray computer and 
in one Cray-day, you could probably establish a pretty good per-
ception of reality for the most complex of parts. 
Dr. B. L. Crowder (IBM): I'd like to say again, NDE keeps being used, 
I think, in the final test mode. I'd like to return back to the 
issue of expert systems. We do a lot of work on that in manufac-
turing and research. 
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One of the points about a lot of the expert systems work is that 
it is, in fact, in its infancy. But the thing that you have to 
remember is that the expert system also provides a way to capture 
knowledge. And in, at least, the semiconductor industry, where 
you don't work just one shift, it turns out that the people who 
work second and third shift tend, in terms of their abilities, not 
to be as good as that real expert on first shift. 
At the present time, we are really looking at expert systems 
basically to supplement the lack of skill at second and third shift, 
not to replace them, necessarily, but to supplement the lack of 
skill. But eventually, what you can actually do over a long period 
of time is to make sure that you can somehow codify the knowledge 
and continue building. In other words, the expert system activity 
has to be flexible enough so that as more knowledge is gained, it 
can be easily added to the system. 
Dr. James Rose (Ames Lab): I would like to make a comment on the first 
talk by Dr. Burte which deals with the flaw characterization as-
pects. 
I think this might be quite difficult to get that prior data base 
that's needed to understand the flaw characteristics, because if 
you have flaws which occur routinely, you tend to engineer them 
out. You modify your process; you get rid of them. I mean, we 
are normally looking at very low probability events with very high 
cost. That's where NDE is used. And we have almost no handle on 
what the flaw population is. 
But with the jet engine disks, for internal flaws, we would sta-
bilize the characterization of internal flaws there if we had some 
idea of what the internal flaw population is, but there are so few 
flaws occurring internally in jet engine disks, that it's just not 
feasible to get a handle on that population distribution, on what 
are the possible kinds of flaws. Again, if we did have some handle 
on it, we would immediately change the engineering process, and 
we wouldn't have those kinds of flaws anymore. We would be back 
in the soup again, as far as the NDE goes. 
So I sense that that's something we have really to think about 
in trying to construct this kind of thing: what are the charac-
teristics of the flaws? Let's not assume that's going to be some-
thing easy to do or even something we can do. 
From the Floor: I'd like to make a comment on the intelligent processing 
of materials relating to the area that I'm very pleased about, what 
we call NDE moving in the processing role. But I agree with Bob 
Gilmore, that in my opinion, before you can have artificial intel-
ligence systems, you have to have a real intelligent person at the 
start, and that means that you need some expert. 
If you look at the viewgraphs that were shown, we see a French 
chef making some very exotic dish and then they showed some idiot 
trying to make the same thing for a thousand people, and they figure, 
give the idiot a computer; he could then make the exotic dish for 
the thousand people. What they forget is that in many systems that 
we are trying to work with, there's no French chef to start with. 
Dr. Ives: If I might, I have observed that quite often, people versed 
in NDE are used as firemen. 
From the Floor: To fight fires. 
Dr. Ives: And it strikes me that Dr. Burte was suggesting, perhaps, 
a change in roles, whereby NDE would be a very active participant 
in the design process. Now, from your own experience, could anyone 
comment upon an experience in your past or your current ativity 
where NDE is an active participant in the design process? 
Dr. Vicky Panhuis (Garrett): All of us in the engine manufacturing 
business or the air frame business are currently in the throes of 
using ASIP, Aircraft Structural Integrity Program, or Engine Struc-
ture Integrity Program, and NDE is a very active part of design 
from the very beginning of critical hardware. It's not maybe an 
area that Dr. Burte is talking about where we have inspectability 
models or manufacturability models, but we are right there when 
the designs are being made and the drawings are being done and de-
ciding whether the part is inspectable during manufacturing and 
all the way through the field. That is happening, at least at 
Garrett, and I know it's happening at Pratt and G.E. also. 
I have one other comment that I want to make before you pose that 
question, though. I'm very much excited about this concept, and 
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I realize all the problems with it, and one of the problems I see, 
as we get more involved in computer technology, is that we have 
experienced, when we put all our stress analyses on the computer, 
that we have grown a crop of stress analysts who don't know the 
problem anymore, that they are very apt to run computer codes over 
and over again for every single possible case they can think of, 
with no forethought about what it means to run the code for that 
particular case. 
We have a whole raft of engineers who don't know that what they 
are modeling is a simple bend test anymore or a tensile test, or 
whatever. They don't know that because of the access to these com-
puter codes, and they also don't know, when they get an answer, 
whether it's right or wrong. And I challenge us that if we do put 
together a system like this, to make sure that we don't create a 
raft of engineers who don't know whether the answer is right or 
wrong. (Applause). 
Dr. Gilmore: We had the same experience when we were making a presen-
tation to the new Admiral of the Nuclear Navy. Someone who was 
making an expert system presentation to him was in the middle of 
defining a very nice format for an expert system, when he thought 
he heard garbage. And of course, he couldn't have heard garbage, 
so he kept right on talking, which turned out to be his next mistake. 
And this was Admiral Keith McKee who was talking. 
And what he told us was that he was not too wild about this expert 
system. He put these computers into Annapolis, and as far as he 
was concerned, the midshipmen spent entirely too much time playing 
Star Wars games and not enough time learning about the Navy. 
But the other thing that he said is that unless these are handled 
very carefully, they were going to eliminate the formation of his 
next generation of experts that he was going to need to maintain 
the fleet, and he had to have these two-legged experts out there 
encountering things that had never been seen before with the truly 
creative ability to assess them, and he didn't feel he was going 
to get that with expert systems, and I think this is pretty much 
what Vicky Panhuis just said. 
Dr. Buckley: At least, my concept of it is a little bit different. 
If you have an expert, a "Leonardo da Vinci", you could simply mul-
tiply his creativity, his capability. You haven't limited it at 
all. 
Now, maybe we won't have as many people who are carriers of the 
knowledge passed on, but they weren't doing the creative role. 
They were assisting in problem-solving. There is a whole body of 
knowledge that can be provided more easily, which is really what 
we are talking about, without giving up two-legged expertise in 
critical roles whatsoever. 
Dr. Gilmore: But the creation of this expert is going to depend on the 
user interface of your expert system, and that's going to have to 
be modeled, and I think this was the message we were getting. 
Dr. Buckley: Those are really important issues. 
Dr. Gilmore: So it's impossible to have the computer answer the wrong 
question. 
M. Panhuis: My intention wasn't to say that you shouldn't do this. 
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I'm very much in agreement that it should be done. What I was doing 
was challenging us to be better at it than we have been in the past. 
Dr. Ives: Is it possible that different NDE methods might be of different 
conflicting design criteria to the designer? 
Dr. Gilmore: Certainly. 
Dr. Panhuis: Definitely. 
Dr. Gilmore: Certainly, not possibly. 
Dr. D. 0. Thompson (Ames Lab): Can I ask a question that's a little 
bit off the track you are on here, Gene? It's in answer to either 
Harris or Jack Lance; some comments you made, Jack, concerning the 
existence of federal codes and their relation to your maintainability 
questions and so on. 
, Are codes in such a format that they could be appropriated -or 
maybe they are -- at the design point? I was wondering if you could 
comment on the status of that point. 
Dr. J. Lance (Yankee Atomic Electric): Well, in the nuclear power in-
dustry, the ASME boiler pressure vessel code section 3 gives you 
the design code, and that, in some ways, is a problem because that 
design code is mandated by the federal law and rigidly held and 
doesn't allow for a lot of flexibility to change . 
. And that problem was addressed recently -- I don't know if Gerry 
Posakony is here or some of the people associated with his organi-
zation -- was addressed in quite an extensive document that actually 
looked at some of the inflexibilities of the design codes when they 
became mandated. Fundamentally, the design codes took the improb-
ables, all of the 10-6 and 10-7 probability events, took those im-
probables and designed to accommodate them and forgot the operating 
stresses. And so there had to be, literally, a change, almost, 
in federal law to get the mistakes out. 
Dr. Thompson: This is clearly a very complex question, but I'm wondering 
if, in a federal code situation, would they ever accept, say, a 
probabilistic determination of a critical flaw size based on some 
sort of failure model for that particular system? Would the code 
follow from the actual structural analysis of the system? Or would 
the code override everything? 
Dr. Lance: No. Up till about two years ago, I think the code would 
have overridden everything, but there is a new move actually driven 
by the regulator to look at probabilistic risk analysis in all phases 
of our operation. So I would think that at least in the nuclear 
power, we are beginning to lead into a probabilistic approach and 
that may overshadow the very rigid design rules, or it could. 
Dr. Ives: We have a question here. 
Dr. A. Notea (Technicon): Yes. Well, it's not really a question. I 
wanted to comment about some of the problems. 
We have a problem for graduates at our university, and most of 
the participants come from industry. They are either engineers 
or scientists after the first degree and they are starting to the 
second and the third, and we push ahead many ways in understanding 
that NDE should be considered immediately at the design stage in 
order to save a lot of troubles later. And it's an ultimate goal, 
of course. 
That's why I agree with the more general approach, as was suggested 
here, where NDE will be part of the design, where options are looked 
for, so that it will be examined in the part, and later, in the 
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manufacturing. And here, NDE will be involved in the control, and 
at the last step, of course, in service, when it will supply information 
about the in-service, from in-service inspection. 
All that will supply the required information in order to improve 
the product. The first product, of course, cannot be an ideal pro-
duct, so there is a need to improve or to study with time, and I 
think that the nuclear industry that was mentioned here is a good 
example of it. 
So, that's why I think that the suggestion that was described 
here by Dr. Burte and later by the people on the panel is a very 
good one, and really will advance us into a new area of engineering 
design. 
And as for costs and so on that were mentioned here, I'm not sure 
that we have to take it very seriously, because this program will 
take a lot of time, and all the costs that we are familiar with 
and also the ways of design and the approaches to design will change 
with time. If we are talking, for example, about the year 2000, 
things will change. We should not look at the future in the same 
way that we are looking at things that we are doing today or to-
morrow. So, NDE in the future will be different, and it will be 
part of the design. 
From the Floor: Lest-we-forget department: the B-1 bomber was designed 
to a specification, MIL-I-6870, Version C, which imposed a require-
ment for integrating NDE into the design. And if we look at the 
history of what happened to this particular specification, it changed 
to a Version D, E, and F, and for both political and economic rea-
sons, the strength of that document has been lost. Where it was 
imposed as a requirement, it now is allowed under certain other 
considerations. 
I think it is a case that if our expert systems, artificial in-
telligence systems, can provde an incentive, then we can be suc-
cessful. If not, we are not going to be any more successful than 
we were with MIL-I-6870 C. 
From the Floor: Counting off of that comment, I'd like to ask a question 
of Dr. Burte. 
You know, in the government, Harris, they don't do anything without 
at least an indication of a return on investment. How do you feel 
that a return on investment can be established for this concept 
in light of the fact that while we have done wondrous work with 
our cad and cam to date, the cost of systems keeps going up, not 
coming down. 
Would you comment on that, please? 
Dr. Burte: Well, I don't quite know how to comment on that. I stopped 
beating my wife a while ago. (Laughter). 
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I think there's been some talk, and I alluded to it earlier --
Mike made it -- and I don't know the answer to it. Now, clearly, 
this concept is going to require, as it evolves, a whole new way 
of doing things. It's a pretty frightening thing to think about. 
Right now, my understanding of the way we buy systems is that 
we set a performance goal and we don't diddle too much -- we try 
not to diddle too much -- with the way the contractor meets that 
goal. We set regulations that are almost like the force of law, 
saying "Thou shalt consider maintainability" and all, but we never 
do. And how are we going to put a warranty on it? What happens 
if you go bankrupt and the warranty isn't held up? We don't have 
a weapons system that works. We can't afford that circumstance. 
You have to have it work. You can't go and, say, get your money 
back because you still won't have a weapons system that will work. 
So there's the problem. 
It's probably going to require some way of specifying the ability 
to predict the reliability and the maintainability and the manu-
facturability that's quite different from anything we do now, and 
that may well be one of the most difficult parts of the problem. 
It's been recognized. But first, we need a little more progress 
in knowing what we can do. You know, I've been talking about some 
things that we ought to be able to do, but we have done almost none 
of it, even in the B-1 case that we just talked about. That was 
a case where we said, "Let us ensure that the inspectability is 
at such and such a level to start with." We didn't say, "Let's 
trade off inspectability versus other things," which is a step beyond 
that and more difficult. We haven't done any of that yet. 
I'm talking about a future goal which I think is reachable, at 
least, incrementally. But I think it's going to require totally 
different ways of doing things. 
From the Floor: I think we have to be very careful that we don't, with 
our military specifications such as ASIP, preclude the very syn-
thesis that you are talking about by codifying a procedure which 
is ossified at the outset and therefore prevents us from doing those 
very things which you have challenged us to do. 
Dr. Burte: There are three dangers in putting things in these systems. 
You've got Scylla and Charybdis. One is that you've got information 
gridlock. Second is that the information becomes trivial when you 
put it in and you regress to mediocrity. 
The other thing is what you were just talking about, and let me 
say again what somebody else said, and I'm trying to say it a·nd 
should say it again: this is not to take the place of the engineer, 
the intelligent, creative man -- in no way. This helps him do his 
job better. And if it's looked at in any other way than that, it's 
a pretty dangerous thing. 
Now, that intelligent, creative engineer 
"Leonardo" and I use it a little advisedly 
ferent sort of engineer. He's going to be 
we have now. And I ask some of you guys -
guys like that? 
Dr. Laszlo Adler (Ohio State): Not yet. 
I use that term 
is going to be a dif-
on a higher level than 
Laszlo, are you training 
Dr. Burte: But what's it going to take? Because these are multi-dis-
ciplinary guys, and that's not a popular thing to try to do. 
From the Floor: When we finish the system, possibly real-time, we will 
do it. 
From the Floor: Let me raise one more nasty question along with the 
last couple. Assuming that we get these systems and we are suf-
ficiently knowledgeable at some point in the future to put a good 
assessment of risk on our structure or on our engine performance 
or on our product, we are now talking about, in these cases, life; 
if it's a commercial aircraft, a lot of lives. Are we actually 
going to put ourselves in the position of making cost/risk, cost/life 
trades, as a design engineer? 
I guess my premise is yes, we are; yes, we have, for some time, 
but don't ask us to talk about it because we will deny that we ever 
considered it. (Laughter). 
How do we deal with that? 
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Dr. Burte: Seems to me we have addressed that problem at excruciating 
length at the beginning of the retirement-for-cause activity. 
From the Floor: We addressed it, but I don't know if we ever answered 
it. 
Dr. Burte: Oh yes we have. Yes, we have. Otherwise, we wouldn't have 
something like retirement for cause or ASIP or, for that matter, 
structural integrity programs before that. In other words, sticking 
your head as an ostrich in the sand is an engineering solution which 
is going to lose in military strength and it's going to lose in 
the world competitive market, I suggest to you. 
Using the information intelligently might allow you to compete, 
in all senses. This is my personal opinion. I'm not speaking for 
the Air Force, but I think the management that doesn't do this, 
that's afraid to do it, will lose the competitive fight, be it mili-
tary or be it commercial. And I think well they should. 
Dr. Ives: Comment here. 
From the Floor: I'd like to raise another question which sort of has 
been hinted but maybe not directly said, and that is the direct 
influence of people or engineers or, actually, a culture of engi-
neering. 
I think these new advanced systems are requLrLng the reliability 
and performance which really cannot be met by a classical engineering 
sense of hard statistics, of hard numbers, of designs from the hand-
book, and we are really not bringing up engineers who can factually 
trade off between failure, between cheating on those statistics, 
in terms of doing something else down the line, between a preventive 
medicine. 
We have a lot of good surgeons but we don't have the diagnostic 
capabilities in which those engineers can fairly look at a system 
and assess it to prevent a catastrophic thing before it happens. 
I think unless we can take maybe a medical approach towards that 
problem -- no matter how good we are in NDE and this new tool that 
you can make these systems more reliable, we have to change that 
culture in engineering so that people, in fact, have hands-on ability 
to design those systems. 
Dr. Buckley: It still seems to me taht all these institutional issues 
sort themselves out, but I keep coming up with two fundamental 
classes of technical issues. 
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One of them is something that this group spent an awful lot of 
effort on, and that was how to make good measurements. And I thought 
Jim rose had a very profound comment when he said, "The pre-existing 
flaw distribution is going to be critical, and none of this is going 
to solve that." That problem was there before trying ceramics. 
It's going to be there forever. I mean, you can pay more money 
and get more data, but there's going to be that factor, and good 
measurement models for techniques are still going to be there. 
None of this is going to change that. 
And the other thing that I think is a critical issue -- it's not 
the right forum to discuss it -- is the issue of consistency of 
all those new models that you're trying to build together, because 
if there is inconsistency, you have no assurance that you are going 
to find a correct answer, let alone anything approaching an optimal 
answer. And we sort of hinted at those things. I guess I see those 
as two classical technical issues. 
The nice part is that you are going to find out an awful lot of 
things that you don't know, and didn't realize you didn't know, 
when you try to put these pieces together. But I'll leave off all 
the institutional problems. 
Dr. Gilmore: I think that we can clarify a lot of things on engineering 
freedom if we specified that the systems we were talking about were 
largely going to be command-driven and not menu-driven, because 
if you work with a command-driven system, then you constantly insert 
the decision-making capability of the individual who's running the 
system. 
And when you talk about replacing the skill or lack of skill on 
the third shift with a menu-driven system -- you see, this is what 
McKee was so angry about. That blunts the ability to develop the 
expert on the third shift. But if he has a command-driven system 
with the proper interface, then the system is going to lead him 
and it's going to make him smart. It's going to improve the person 
as well as improving the system. 
And when Harris talks about the retirement for cause and the ASIP, 
these were complex things and they were interactive programs, but 
they were really formulating command-driven systems. And I, for 
one, won't build an acoustic microscope that isn't a command-driven 
system. I don't want anybody running one that doesn't want a 
command-driven system. 
Dr. Richard K. Elsley (Rockwell Science Center): I'd like to draw an 
analogy and make a tongue-in-cheek suggestion. From the beginning 
of the time of computers, people thought it wouldn't be all that 
hard to get computers to translate languages, understand natural 
language, and play chess at the level of a grand master. None of 
those goals have really been achieved yet, but there are commercial 
products out there that are doing useful parts of those problems 
in useful ways for people. That brave new world that Harris has 
asked us to create may follow a similar pattern. It may not actually 
be achieved within any of our lifetimes, but useful pieces will 
come about. 
Now, to address the concern about the expert systems becoming 
a crutch and preventing new expertise from being developed, I would 
like to suggest that organizations using such systems have in place 
a substantial cash bonus program for people who can prove that the 
expert system is wrong. (Laughter). You see, what this will do 
is either result in the improvement of the expert systems to where 
they are good enough or put such an economic drain on the organi-
zation that they will have to stop using the expert system. 
(Laughter). 
Dr. Clark: Let me make a response to that. 
At Westinghouse, we are in, probably, the second year now in 
commercial application of the expert systems for the interpretation 
of eddy current data; again, a system designed to, at the outset, 
assist the field inspector. I think it's critical how you first 
put the program into place. 
After having seen what the tool was capable of doing, I think 
the bottom line of two years of experience is a real plus in aspects 
of making the inspectors much better than they were previously. 
The system that we use has the capability of keeping track of who 
did what when --also identifying things that haven't been seen 
before. 
That particular aspect of the adventure has been tremendous in 
that it keeps the expert inspectors on their toes. They express 
their data in a more common format than they did previously. The 
inspector-to-inspector communication in different plants has in-
creased tremendously. 
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And in my own personal op1n1on, one of the most significant ad-
vances of that whole program is that we have a great improvement 
in credibility between the field inspectors and the so-called ex-
perts, because the final package that we put together was very clear 
to make this thing tick. The field inspectors had as much expert 
input as the physicists and scientists that fed in from the other 
end. 
So, I don't really have as much concern about these kinds of 
programs getting out of hand as some of you might in terms of the 
overall implementation of a rational program. It's worked quite 
successfully. 
Dr. Ives: Don, did you have a comment? 
Dr. Thompson: I had a question, but it's going to change the subject. 
I don't know much about computer-aided design systems. Is the 
status of computer-aided design such that significant advances have 
to be made to incorporate these kinds of thoughts, or is it a do-
able problem from the point of view where you are now? 
Dr. Clark: From my perspective, I think we can do it today. 
Dr. Ives: Other comments? How do you put together your expert system 
such that there is appropriate voting when different NDE techniques 
demand different things of the designer? 
Dr. Clark: Let me make it clear, our program is designed at one par-
ticular, relatively simple piece of hardware. Steam-generated 
tubes, per se, are all the sam~ material, same general design, so 
that we use one system, eddy current, specifically. 
Dr. Ives: But is it possible that a different kind of flaw might grow 
in the manufacturing process by the nature of the process, that 
the one programmed NDE technique would no longer be applicable? 
Dr. Clark: I would tend to doubt that, but there are other problems 
that have arisen along the lines of deposit formation during ser-
vice, which would preclude the use of eddy current, and we have, 
in fact, switched to sonics in some cases. But the interesting 
thing is that the expert system was telling us that it had to be 
done before we really noted it. 
Dr. Ives: I have my experience of materials not being materials that 
they were supposed to be. How can you incorporate expert systems 
to give the designer aid when he's getting conflicting direction 
from the -ilities? Would you care to comment on that? 
Dr. Clark: Yes. That's a real important area of concern, and what we 
have.been trying to do, at our organization, anyway, is we are 
trying to use NDE technology to assess inherent material properties, 
not necessarily the presence of void-type defects. And one of the 
reasons for it is we like to be in a position to be looked on as 
1822 
a more positive contributor to the design stage. I think that's 
a hurdle we have to get over. 
So as a result, we have been doing a lot of first-time assessment 
of material at a relatively high sensitivity level where we are 
collecting a lot of information that wouldn't necessarily tie in 
to some threshold flaw, but we then save that information and do 
repeat inspections through service and compare one set of inspection 
data, which is very easy to do now on computers we have, and just 
move through and try to see changes in the material properties that 
would be a factor in early development of damage. 
It's a very difficult thing to do and it's hard for a lot of 
operations to appreciate what you intend to do with that data. 
In other words, some people have negative feelings with regard to 
inspectability. So we tell them, "We are going to start inspection 
at a much more sensitive level and keep that data and use that as 
a base line for in-field inspection at a later time." It's not 
easy to do because it's hard to deal with people. They must think 
that it's going to be to their advantage. 
Dr. Panhuis: To answer your question a little bit, I think you have 
to find what your end result is. If you have two inspection tech-
niques that you're going to use -- for instance, ultrasonic inspec-
tion of a forging before manufacture into a disk and eddy current 
after manufacturing to look for surface defect -- and you get con-
flicting requirements for the design of that part, then you have 
to look at your final goal. What's you final assessment of that? 
Is it the estimated life of that part, and which one of those gives 
you the higher risk to take if you don't have the optimal inspection? 
I think that's what has to be taken into account in expert systems 
like that. If you have conflicting results, you have to look at 
some kind of a risk factor. After all, that's what we do now in 
design, when we design the material properties or whatever. There's 
a risk factor associated with a wide failure rate, and the same 
thing could be applied here. You have to define that risk before 
you can decide which one you are not going to optimize completely. 
That's one way, maybe. 
Dr. Clark: The way we have been trying to address that in hardware, 
again, in steam generator work in particular, we use probes that 
have both ultrasonic and eddy current sensors and collect the data 
simultaneously. But what we have been trying to do is the following. 
On tubes removed from service, prior to metallurgical characteri-
zation or what have you, we collect the data with a single unit, 
four directions of ultrasound, coupled with eddy current responses. 
And clearly, depending on the nature of the damage, different defects 
have different value. 
Dr. Panhuis: I think his question was more directed at the initial design 
part, and the design says --if the expert system comes out for ul-
trasonics, the design should look like this. But for eddy current, 
it should look like this, which one do you go with? 
Dr. Clark: I appreciate your concern. The problem I'm looking at is 
that the original design position was that you never have any 
damage. It just sits there. We have 26 different kinds of damage. 
Dr. Panhuis: This is in the future, from now on. 
Dr. Clark: Well, you have to face the real world. There are many prob-
lems out there that are sitting there looking for attention today, 
as well as all the new concerns to worry about. I think what we 
have to do is be able to integrate both the in-service characteri-
zation of our hardware as well as capturing that information, feeding 
it up front to the early design. I think it's all one big picture. 
It doesn't necessarily get looked at that way, but it's a whole 
concept. 
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From the Floor: I had several thoughts that came to me. One was the 
engineer's associate that Dr. Burte spoke about. It seemed to me 
that that could be modeled as a network of expert systems. It's 
a mini network of separate expert systems. I think that's an in-
teresting way of viewing it. 
Secondly, how in the world do you go about thinking about how 
you network systems? We haven't even got the ability to build one 
yet very well. We don't have to worry about the answer yet because 
we've got to handle the first problem first. But if you want to 
know some of the problems that you will be faced with on networking, 
get in and study the problem that you go through when building the 
single expert now. Westinghouse has got an expert system program 
going. 
Maybe it would be advisable to put a progranuner in the background 
to observe the processes to go in that system, simply codify it; 
what are the experiences that you get through. I think if you start 
to assimilate some of that data, you might start seeing a trail 
that you are going to have to be following in the future. 
Dr. Clark: Exactly. That's what we are trying to capture. 
Dr. Ives: For a given NDE technique, are probability of flaw detection 
spaces reasonably well defined today? For a given NDE technique, 
in order for data from that technique to be useful in the model, 
as Dr. Burte suggested, it seems to me that the spatial character-
istic of probability of detection needs to be defined. It's not 
a single-value D function, right? It depends on the size of the 
flaw and the depth of the flaw and the aspect of the flaw. So, 
is the probability of detection of flaws, in that spatial sense, 
reasonably well-characterized today for various NDE methods? 
From the Floor: You know, I think that's the problem-- maybe you hit 
it. This conference is called Quantitative NDE. By and large, 
NDE right now is qualitative. That means we have the mechanics; 
we have the ability to model things in the exact sense of materials 
response. NDE is such that it basically says, "Make me a specimen 
which looks somewhat like what I need to look at, and I'll tell 
you it works." Now, that's really hard to model in an intelligent 
system, expert system. In fact, it's impossible. 
I think the gas turbine engine is a very specific case. You take 
a composite structure, the main frame of an aircraft, a wing, and 
somebody gives you a drawing and says, "How would you inspect it, 
and what is your ability to find such and such a flaw?" The only 
thing you can do is to pull your hair until somebody gives you a 
specimen, and you do something with it. 
From the Floor: Lockheed did a study program for the Air Force called 
"Have cracks, will travel." They generated some simulated structure 
with deliberately induced fatigue cracks and carried those specimens 
to various locations throughout the depot-level Air Force and de-
termined what the inspection probabilities were for those methods, 
for those structures, and for those locations. They were decidedly 
less than we hoped and varied rather grossly from one location to 
another. Yes, it's possible to quantify them, but the result of 
that was a drive towards automated inspection systems, where you 
get uniformity. 
Dr. Ives: There is a challenge from that to this conununity? 
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Dr. Ward Rummel (Martin Marietta): Well, maybe I can address that. 
I think there's a challenge. I'm not sure we know how to use it. 
But for instance, we heard in a session today, with the new RFC 
system, we can see flaws five mills deep. Now, if I put that in 
my model and I need to build one satellite, as we do in our own 
company, how do I communicate that I'm not going to use that same 
criteria for one satellite because not only is it not applicable 
in the near term; it would not be applicable for the satellite at 
all in the time frame and certainly not within the cost frame? 
So, some way, we have to put information in that takes into account 
the resource availability or practicality and the cost of doing 
that, because in the case of the satellite, I'm going to take a 
more expensive route to design out the need to do an inspection 
of that kind, where I may not do it if I had many, many parts. 
So, it's not a simple plug-it-in-the-table-and-look-it-up-later 
that's applicable for all problems. It just doesn't work that way. 
From the Floor: Let me add one more complication. These kinds of numbers 
are very geometry-sensitive. So if you specified the particular 
geometry that you're going to inspect in great detail, you can 
probably end up with a pretty good probability number on it, but 
you are very hard-pressed to generalize that without that specific 
geometry determination. 
From the Floor: Another major concern is that very often, the inspection 
procedures we use are designed either to detect or to characterize. 
Our experience clearly has been those tools we use to characterize 
may not work for detection, so you've got to decide which route 
you are taking. And that can be a really serious problem because 
the detection tools are so different. 
From the Floor: In fact, an example is, I think, the B-1 aircraft. 
It was brought up here before as a fracture critical design. One 
of the things I know is that the area of specification and the ex-
perience of NDE for ultrasonic testing of the honeycomb. The design 
is 12 inch-thick stabilized honeycomb with composite skins and com-
posite core. But this was the specification because that's how 
it was read out of the manual. Now, it makes no difference. That 
was a black-and-white page in a specification; it was a lot of head-
aches in NDE. Now, we have a design, 12-inch-thick honeycomb, and 
we make it, inspect it, and fly it. 
Dr. Ives: Dr. Burte, do you have any questions for the panel or for 
the audience? 
Dr. Burte: I asked mine. Dale, is there anything you want to ask? 
Dr. Dale Chimenti (AF Materials Lab): Is there any possibility that 
at some point, the modeling of the P.O.D. process leads us in a 
direction where the connection between the modeling and the opti-
mization of the inspection process becomes a problem? 
Dr. Buckley: You must be thinking of some potential problem. 
Dr. Chimenti: Well, a model, for example, may become too complicated 
to optimize easily. If it's partly heuristic and party determin-
istic, how does one then use it in a predictive sense? 
Dr. Buckley: Given a problem, most analysts will do the simple model 
on critical parts of it. If you are trying to model ultrasonic 
propagation of a complex structure, you are probably just going 
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to do some simple calculations at critical points where they are 
changing rapidly, things like that. 
Well, why can't you attack the problem just that way, and have 
heuristic rules to look for where to do the simple calculation in-
stead of doing the whole thing? And I think that's a fairly rational 
approach. You have to be careful with those rules, but that's what 
the analyst does anyway. 
Dr. Chimenti: That's assuming the process is sequential, that you can 
start at one point with the heuristic rules and then eventually 
lead to a point where you simplify it, in a certain sense, suffi-
ciently now to be deterministic. 
Dr. Buckley: Yes. 
Dr. Chimenti: Would that always be the case? 
Dr. Buckley: No. Not necessarily, but I don't know. 
Dr. Clark: Well, I think one of the things you've got to watch is to 
tie your modeling capability to your service experience. I hate 
to dwell on that point, but I've seen too many cases. A good example 
I've seen is in turbine disks. I can show you dozens of disks where 
the material environment, what have you, decided to defy the rules 
of modeling and develop cracks in the free port, ignoring the stress. 
So any of these models, I think, have to be specific in terms 
of the application that you are looking at, and make sure you have 
an adequate amount of feedback from the field. A lot of the problems 
we have are created because the designers have put these things 
together, and the materials people didn't ever envision the potential 
problem, so there wasn't much in the way of inspection at the time 
it should have been done. As a result, we are caught up in the 
situation now where we have a lot of hardware that's very difficult 
to inspect. The problems develop from there. 
I think that field performance is abolutely critical. And at 
least in our industry, through EPRI, we tried to coordinate with 
different utilities on problems at one time or another. Essentially, 
we have a central area where we can collect that information to 
see how the industry is pursuing it, how things are happening. 
And without that, modeling is really tough. Verification of the 
modeling is tough. 
Dr. Ives: Well, I'd like to thank Dr. Burte and the panelists, and that's 
the end of the session tonight. 
(Applause) 
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